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Signals to subjects to forget presignal items (F-items) can completely eliminate the pro- 
active interference postsignal items (R-items) would normally suffer from the F-items. To 
determine what happens to F-items, a strategy-control procedure was developed to test 
memory for F-items without destroying forget-signal credibility. The subjects saw short 
lists of paired associates, Some containing a signal to forget presignal pairs. After each list, 
a single stimulus probe tested memory for the appropriate response. Tested pairs were 
always R-pairs unless a prearranged cue informed the subjects that the stimulus was from an 
F-pair. Although F-pairs did not interfere with recall of R-pairs, there was substantial recall 
of and interference among F-pairs. The results support a set differentiation mechanism of 
directed forgetting. 
The processes by which information no 
longer needed is eliminated or set aside are as 
fundamental to the efficient functioning of an 
information processing system as are the pro- 
cesses by which information is acquired. Any 
limited capacity system without the means to 
select and eliminate is doomed to an unfor- 
tunate and incoherent end; without some 
mechanism to prevent old information from 
interfering with the processing of current 
information, the system's output will eventu- 
ally bear no sensible relation to its input. 
One promising approach to the problem of 
information elimination is the recent active 
research on directed forgetting (for reviews see 
Bjork, 1972; Epstein, 1972). This approach 
centers on the use of signals to subjects that 
they can forget some or all of the information 
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they have been presented. Such signals (F-cues) 
can have remarkable effects; subjects are 
able, for example, to take advantage of F-cues 
in some situations in a way that completely 
eliminates the proactive interference that in- 
formation presented subsequent to the F-cue 
would normally suffer from the preceding to- 
be-forgotten information. The present study 
concerns itself with the fate of to-be-forgotten 
information (F-items). Rather than to in- 
directly investigate the effects of an F-cue on 
F-items by looking at whether or not F-items 
interfere with to-be-remembered information 
(R-items), the present study employs direct 
tests of subjects' memory for F-items. 
The reasons one would want to test subjects' 
memory for F-items are obvious: The extent 
to which F-items are or are not recallable or 
recognizable in different situations provides 
a basis for inferring the mechanisms by which 
F-items are marked, segregated, erased, or 
whatever. Unfortunately, there are obvious 
and formidable problems in attempting to test 
F-items. Given that the directed-forgetting 
paradigm is based on instructing subjects that 
an F-signal means forget the designated items, 
any test of F-items violates fair play to some: 
extent. 
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Several different procedures have been used 
to test whether subjects can recall F-items. 
Weiner and Reed (1969) introduced the 
straightforward procedure of  cuing subjects 
at the onset of an item in a Brown-Peterson 
paradigm whether to remember or to forget 
the item, but testing for recall of the item in 
either case. This procedure for testing F- 
items is, unfortunately, as problematical as it is 
straightforward. Since subjects are cued to 
forget items they know they will have to recall, 
one cannot be sure that they are trying to for- 
get when cued to do so, or, for that matter, 
that they always try to recall F-items when 
they are asked to. A second procedure (Bjork, 
1970; Bruce & Papay, 1970; Davis & Okada, 
1971) consists of testing F-item recall on the 
last trial or two of an experiment, at which 
time subjects presumably believe F-cues, and, 
since the experiment proper is over, one can do 
little harm by destroying their faith in F-cues. 
There are three problems with this procedure. 
(a) Since such tests come as a surprise to the 
subjects, they are disruptive and may, there- 
fore, result in impaired performance. (b) Only 
one or two such surprise tests can be tacked on 
the end of a given experiment, which makes 
them an inefficient way to gather data on the 
recall of F-items. (e) And because of practice 
effects, proactive interference, or whatever, 
performance on trials at the end of an experi- 
ment may not be characteristic of perform- 
ance throughout the experiment. A third pro- 
cedure (see Woodward & Bjork, 1971) con- 
sists of a delayed recall test for all items pre- 
sented during an experimental session. The 
results of such a test can be informative, but 
they provide no measure of subjects' ability to 
recall F-items immediately following any 
given trial of the experiment. 
This paper introduces a new procedure for 
testing F-items that is designed to avoid the 
problems inherent in the procedures outlined 
above. The procedure consists of a combina- 
tion of pretraining and strategy-control 
instructions that permits the testing of F- 
items on a number of different trials during an 
experiment. Subjects are first trained on a 
series of trials during which F-items are never 
tested. They are then informed that the re- 
mainder of the experiment will consist of 
trials just like those already presented, except 
that there will be infrequent trials on which 
F-items rather than R-items will be tested. 
They are told that all tests of F-items will be 
designated by a special signal presented at the 
time of any such test, and that their best 
strategy is to behave as if F-items were never 
going to be tested; that is, they are told to con- 
tinue, as in the pretraining session, to forget 
F-items and to remember R-items. 
The success of this procedure depends, of 
course, on subjects behaving in the "as if"  
fashion asked of them. One purpose of the 
present experiment is to explore the use of such 
strategy-control manipulations as experi- 
mental tools. Given that subjects can establish 
a measure of control over their strategies, the 
systematic control of strategies constitutes an 
important tool for investigating basic cog- 
nitive mechanisms (Reitman, 1970). With the 
present procedure, if performance on trials 
when R-items are tested is characteristic of 
performance in an equivalent experiment not 
involving tests of F-items, then one has some 
evidence that subjects were consistently trying 
to forget F-items. 
In order to have a reference experiment 
against which to evaluate the effects of the 
strategy-control procedure, the present ex- 
periment follows closely an experiment re- 
ported by Bjork (1970). Subjects were pre- 
sented lists of one to eight paired associates, 
and following each list a stimulus member 
from one of the pairs in the list was presented 
as a probe test of subjects' memory for the 
paired response. In some lists, there was a 
signal to forget the pairs presented prior to 
the signal. Since subjects could not anticipate 
when a list would contain such a signal (F-cue), 
they were forced to attempt to learn each pair 
as it was presented. At the end of lists that con- 
tained a forget signal, one of the postsignal 
pairs was tested on all but those infrequent 
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trials where asterisks next to the test stimulus 
informed the subjects that a presignal pair 
(F-pair) was being tested. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 82 undergraduate women in the 
University of Michigan. They were each paid $2.00 
for their participation. 
Apparatus and Materials 
The apparatus was a PDP-8 computer and scope. 
Each paired associate in a list was presented for 2.2 
sec, with a .8-sec interval between pairs. The first pair 
in a list was shown either directly above or below a 
dashed horizontal reference line on the scope. The 
subsequent pairs in the list were either all presented in 
the same position as the first pair, or, at some point in 
the list, there was a change in position, relative to the 
reference line, of the next pair in the list. The latter 
event was a prearranged signal to subjects to forget the 
pairs in the list presented prior to the position change. 
The paired associates consisted of nonsense syl- 
lables as stimuli (selected from Archer, 1960, norms 
range 38-62) and words as responses (Thorndike- 
Lorge rating 18-AA). Following each list, a single test 
stimulus was presented as a probe test of subjects' 
memory for the response that had been paired with that 
stimulus on the list. The test stimulus appeared on the 
screen by itself, without a reference line, .8 sec after the 
last pair in the list and it remained on the screen until 
the subject wrote her response on a 3 × 5 card and 
placed the card in a box in front of her. When a pre- 
signal (F-pair) was tested, an asterisk was presented 
next to the test stimulus as an indicator to subjects 
that the word to be recalled was from a pair they had 
been instructed to forget. 
The experimental materials, the timing intervals, and 
the general procedure were chosen to correspond ex- 
actly to Bjork's (1970, Experiment I) reference experi- 
ment. The only differences other than the testing of 
F-items and strategy manipulation in the present 
study were that Bjork used a Carousel slide projector 
to present his lists, and a color change in the back- 
ground of a slide served as the forget cue. 
Design 
In what follows, (a, b) denotes a list of a presignal 
pairs and b postsignal pairs, and (a, b:c) indicates a 
test of the cth postsignal pair in an (a, b) list. An asterisk 
is added, giving (a, b: *c), if the tested trigram came 
from a presignal pair. 
Lists followed by tests of postsignat pairs varied in 
length from one to eight pairs. Each such list included 
0, 1, 2, or 3 presignal pairs, followed by 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 
postsignal pairs. Combining each of the four possible 
presignal sublist lengths with each of the five possible 
postsignal sublist lengths resulted in 20 different pre- 
signal-postsignal list constructions. Sixty lists were 
required in order to test every postsignal serial position 
in every (a, b) list type. The complete set of test condi- 
tions is shown in Table 1. 
Lists used to test recall of presignal pairs were con- 
structed of 1, 2, 3, or 4 presignal pairs, followed by 1, 2, 
3, or 4 postsignal pairs, except that total list length did 
not exceed five pairs. There were 10 such list construc- 
tions: (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (1,4), (2,1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), 
(3, 2), and (4, 1). The constraint on total length was 
adopted to limit the number of tests of presignal pairs. 
Every presignal serial position was tested once, except 
in the condition where there were four presignal pairs. 
Here only the (4, 1 : *4) test was included, again in order 
to minimize tests of pairs subjects had been asked to 
forget. Altogether, 17 tests of presignal pairs were 
included in the experiment. The set of presignal test 
conditions is shown in Table 2. 
One hundred and fourteen lists of trigram-word pairs 
were used in the experiment. Five of the lists were pre- 
sented as examples during the instructions. Sixty of the 
remaining 105 lists were identical to the 60 used in 
Bjork's (1970) study, and the other 49 lists were con- 
structed from trigrams and words similar to those used 
by Bjork. 
After subjects had been practiced in the standard 
experimental procedure used by Bjork (1970), they 
• worked through 16 lists analogous to the first 16 of the 
60 lists from Bjork's Experiment I, to stabilize their 
expectations and performance. Next, after they had 
been given the additional strategy control instructions, 
the 93 lists constituting the experiment proper were 
presented. The 93 lists consisted of a replication of 
Bjork's 60 lists intermixed with 17 lists testing recall of 
presignal pairs, plus a final 16 lists. Three of the 16 
final lists were followed by uninformed tests of pre- 
signal pairs (no asterisk appeared along with the test 
stimulus); the remaining lists were included for other 
purposes and are not further discussed in this paper. 
An adaptation of the counterbalancing procedures 
described by Bjork was used to generate the 16 dif- 
ferent sets of 109 lists. This procedure was employed in 
order to minimize effects due to individual pairs and to 
replicate Bjork's (1970) design. 
Procedure 
After the initial instructions, practice lists, and 
16 training lists, the experimenter read the additional 
strategy control instructions describing the "as if" 
procedure the subject was to follow. The significant 
paragraphs are here reproduced verbatim: 
We are also interested in what happens to the old 
pairs that were forgotten, so occasionally in the 
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next lists we will check on a pair that you were told to 
forget about. You will always know when this 
happens, because the nonsense syllable will have an 
asterisk in front of it. Let me show you an example. 
[An additional example list was presented.] 
I f  you happened to remember it, the word you 
would have written down was knight. Okay? The 
asterisk was the signal that the pair was one you were 
supposed to forget about. In the rest of the experi- 
ment there will be a few asterisked items. Their pur- 
pose is to let us compare what happens to pairs you 
are trying to remember with what happens to pairs 
you are no longer trying to keep in mind. I f  an 
asterisked nonsense syllable occurs and you remem- 
ber the word that goes with it, fine; write it down. 
The important thing, though, is to keep on doing 
just what you have been doing up until now. When 
there is a change in position from above the line to 
below, or vice versa, forget about the old pairs and 
try to remember the new ones. Any questions ? 
Immediately upon completion of the experiment, 
each subject was interviewed to determine whether she 
had been able to carry out the strategy control instruc- 
tions successfully. She was asked what she thought the 
purpose of the experiment was; whether she had had 
any doubts about what we were looking for; whether 
she had been distracted by the occasional tests of pairs 
she was supposed to forget; whether those tests had 
changed her performance in any way. She was also 
asked what she had done to memorize pairs, to forget 
presignal pairs, and to respond to the test syllables. 
RESULTS 
There was no prior basis for deciding 
whether occasional failure to follow the 
strategy control instructions might affect per- 
formance significantly. Thus, only those sub- 
jects whose answers suggested that they had 
followed the instructions perfectly, with no 
evidence of lapses at any time during the 
course of the experiment, were included in the 
TABLE 1 
PROPORTIONS CORRECT ON TESTS OF POSTSIGNAL PAIRS 
Number of presignal pairs 
Number of Postsignal 
postsignal pairs pair tested 0 1 2 
1 (1) .97 1.00 .97 1.00 
2 (I) .94 .77 .84 .84 
(2) 1.00 .97 .97 .88 
Mean .97 .87 .91 .86 
3 (1) .59 .50 .66 .56 
(2) .66 .72 .75 .75 
(3) .87 .91 .97 .91 
Mean .71 .71 .79 .74 
4 (1) .41 .50 .41 .34 
(2) .47 .50 .50 .38 
(3) .69 .66 .69 .50 
(4) .94 .88 .94 .84 
Mean .63 .63 .63 .52 
5 (1) .34 .28 .34 .47 
(2) .28 .28 .34 .22 
(3) .31 .47 .40 .28 
(4) .59 .47 .59 .44 
(5) .94 .78 .91 .91 
Mean .49 .46 .52 .46 
Grand mean .75 .73 .76 .72 
Mean from Bjork's Experiment I .73 .75 .77 .76 
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basic experimental group. Eighty-two sub- 
jects were tested in order to secure a basic 
experimental group of 32 subjects, with two 
subjects assigned to each of the 16 sets of lists. 
The experiment does not require that all 
subjects be able to follow the instructions, but 
it entails predictions only for those who do. 
Thus, the following analyses concentrate pri- 
marily on the basic experimental group. 
Recall of Postsignal Pairs 
Table 1 presents the proportion of correct 
responses for the 32 criterial subjects for every 
combination of list type and serial position 
tested in the 60 replication lists. These results 
are strikingly similar to those obtained by 
Bjork (1970). In particular, the presignal pairs 
appear to provide no proactive interference: 
Performance in the cases where the length of 
the postsignal sublist is held constant is inde- 
pendent of the number of presignal pairs in 
the list. The effect of serial position within 
postsignal sublists also appears in every way 
typical of the results obtained in such probe 
experiments. 
Whereas Table 1 implies that presignal items 
do not interfere proactively with subjects' per- 
formance on postsignal items, Figure l shows 
that postsignal items preceding a tested item 
do produce substantial proactive interference. 
At each level of retroactive interference, as 
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after the probed pair, performance on post- 
signal pairs declines as a function of the num- 
ber of preceding postsignal pairs (PI = 0, 1, 2). 
Further evidence that the instruction to 
forget attenuates or eliminates proactive inter- 
ference comes from an examination of intru- 
sions. If we consider only lists in which both 
presignal and postsignal intrusion errors are 
possible (i.e., exclude lists in which there were 
either no presignal items or only one post- 
signal item), there are a total of 50l errors 
(intrusions and omissions) in all. Of these, .05 
were presignal intrusions, and .82 were post- 
signal intrusions. In Bjork's (1970) experiment 
(see his Table 2), the comparable proportions 
were .04 and.66. Thus, the ratio of presignal to 
postsignal intrusions is 1:16 in both cases. 
Recall of Presignal Pairs 
The preceding analysis of performance on 
postsignal pairs yields a very pleasant result: 
Despite the added strategy control procedures, 
the probes of presignal pairs, and the change in 
apparatus, the instruction to forget appears to 
have eliminated proactive interference due to 
presignal pairs exactly as in Bjork's (1970) ex- 
perinaent. Thus, one can analyze performance 
on presignal pairs with some confidence that 
at least the 32 criterial subjects were consist- 
ently trying to forget the presignal pairs. The 
unparenthesized numbers in Table 2 give the 
proportions of correct responses to probes of 
presignal pairs for each of the 17 (a, b:*c) list 
constructions used in the experiment. It is 
clear from Table 2 that considerable informa- 
tion about these pairs is retained. However, 
the table also shows an increased rate of infor- 
mation loss over time due to the instruction to 
forget. The parenthesized numbers are from 
tests of the same serial positions in lists having 
comparable total lengths, but no signals to 
forget. If we compare corresponding figures, 
contrasting for example the .94 proportion 
correct for the (0, 2: 1) lists with the .75 pro- 
portion correct for the (1, 1:*1) lists, we see 
that performance on pairs from lists without a 
signal to forget always is at least as good as 
STRATEGY CONTROL AND FORGETTING 
TABLE 2 
PROPORTIONS CORRECT ON TESTS OF PRESIGNAL PAIRS 
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Number of postsignal pairs 
Number of Presignal 
presignal pairs pair tested 1 2 3 
I (*I) .75 (.94) .34 (.59) 
2 (*1) .44 (.59) .22 (.41) 
(*2) .63 (.66) .34 (.47) 
3 (*1) .28 (.41) .25 (.34) 
(*2) .34 (.47) .28 (.28) 
(*3) .34 (.69) .13 (.31) 





Note. The proportions in parentheses indicate performance on tests of comparable items in 
lists containing no instruction to forget. 
performance on the corresponding presignal 
pairs, and usually is substantially better. 
Table 1 demonstrates that there is no pro- 
active interference effect of presignal items 
(F-pairs) upon postsignal items (R-pairs). 
Presignal items, however, do have a substan- 
tial proactive interference effect upon subse- 
quent presignal items, as is evident from 
Figure 2. The correct recall proportions for 
presignal pairs shown in the figure are 
averaged over constructions in which the pre- 
signal pairs are followed by either one or two 
postsignal pairs, z For instance, the leftmost 
point in the figure, with a value of .27, is an 
average for the (3, l :* l )  and (3, 2 : '1)  con- 
structions. 
Comparing corresponding points, we find, 
for example, the correct recall proportion for 
pairs immediately preceding the signal to 
forget to be .54 when the presignal sublist 
contains only that one pair; it is .49 when the 
tested pair is preceded by one other presignal 
pair; and it is only .24 when the tested pair is 
preceded by the two other presignal pairs. 
These are the three vertically aligned points 
above *(n) in Figure 2. 
Intrusions on tests of presignal pairs reveal 
2 Since the total length of the lists used to test pre- 
signal recall could not exceed five pairs, postsignal 
sublists containing more than two pairs could not 
occur with all possible presignal sublists. Hence lists 
containing postsignal sublists of three or four pairs 
were not considered in this analysis. 
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upon recall of subsequent presignal pairs, where n 
denotes the total number of presignal pairs. *( ) de- 
notes the position tested, with *(n) being the final 
presignal pair. 
a very different pattern from that on tests of 
postsignal pairs, reported above. On tests of 
presignal pairs, averaged over all cases in which 
both kinds of intrusions are possible, the pro- 
portion of presignal intrusions is .30, and the 
proportion of postsignal intrusions is. 11. This 
is in clear contrast to the results for post-signal 
pairs. 
As a further check on the comparability of 
the procedures used in the present study with 
those employed by Bjork (1970), three unin- 
formed tests of presignal pairs were included 
at the end of the present study. The lists 
corresponded to the (2, 3: '2),  (3, 2: '3),  and 
(3, 2 : '1)  constructions, except that in each 
case no asterisk was presented with the test 
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stimulus. As expected on the basis of Bjork's 
results, the correct response proportions ob- 
tained were all close to zero, .06,. 12, and .09, 
respectively. 
Is Memory Capacity Constant ? 
Relative to the performance levels obtained 
when no forget signal is present, we have 
observed, on the one hand, a decrement in 
performance on presignal items, and on the 
other hand, a gain in performance on the post- 
signal test lists. Taken together, these two 
observations suggest that the memory capacity 
a subject uses in this experiment may perhaps 
be a constant quantity, something allocated 
over presignal and postsignal items as a func- 
tion of the instructions to forget. 
We can evaluate this conjecture by compar- 
ing performance on lists having the same total 
length, but differing in the number of presignal 
versus postsignal pairs they contain. Thus, for 
example, as shown in Table 3, we find that the 
proportion correct averaged over the (0, 5:1), 
(0, 5: 2), (0, 5: 3), (0, 5: 4), and (0, 5: 5) con- 
structions is .49. This figure is essentially the 
same as that obtained when we take compar- 
able averages from all other sets of lists having 
a total length of five, regardless of the number 
of presignal pairs those sets contain. Thus, for 
instance, when we average over the (3, 2:*1), 
(3, 2: '2) ,  (3,2: '3) ,  (3, 2:1), and (3, 2:2) con- 
structions, that is, over all lists of length five 
consisting of three presignal pairs and two 
postsignal pairs, we find the overall proportion 
correct to be .48. The conjecture is not fully 
supported by the data shown in Table 3. There 
is some decrement as the number of presignal 
pairs increases when we consider all lists of 
length two, and also in the case of lists of 
length four. All the figures seem close enough 
to make the conjecture worthy of further in- 
vestigation, however. 
Performance of Noneriterial Subjects 
All of the analyses described above also were 
carried out on the data for the 50 noncriterial 
subjects. The results generally correspond very 
TABLE 3 
AVERAGE PROPORTION CORRECT AS A FUNCTION OF 
LENGTHS OF PRESIGNAL AND POSTSIGNAL SUBLISTS 
Number of presignal pairs 
Total list 
length 0 1 2 3 
2 ,97 .88 - -  - -  
3 .71 .69 .68 --  
4 .63 .58 .60 .49 
5 .49 .52 ,51 .48 
Note. Proportions are averages over all serial posi- 
tions. 
closely to the findings already reported for the 
basic experimental group, but there are some 
small differences. For example, noncriterial 
subjects have somewhat higher recall scores 
for presignal pairs, and they intrude a slightly 
higher proportion of presignal responses on 
tests ofpostsignal pairs. As in these cases, what 
differences there are between the two groups 
generally can be accounted for by assuming 
that noncriterial subjects were less consistent 
in following the strategy control instructions. 
DISCUSSION 
The present experiment was productive in 
several ways. (a) The results go well beyond 
any past efforts to test presignal, F-items in 
terms of providing a picture of the fate of F- 
items in memory. (b) The results provide strong 
support for set differentiation as a mechanism 
of directed forgetting, and they argue against 
erasure and decay mechanisms. (c) And the 
results demonstrate the usefulness of strategy 
control as an experimental technique. 
The Fate of To-be-forgotten Items 
The systematic testing of F-items in the cur- 
rent experiment yields a number of important 
results not available in past studies. (a) There is 
a stunning difference between performance on 
informed tests of F-items and uninformed tests 
of F-items. When a prearranged cue informed 
subjects that a presignal pair was being tested, 
they were able to recall the correct response at a 
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level equal to about 60 ~ the level at which 
they could recall the correct response from a 
comparable postsignal pair; when an F-pair 
was tested without informing subjects as to 
the nature of the test, performance was 
essentially zero. (b) Even though F-items do 
not interfere with performance on R-items, 
they interfere with performance on other F- 
items. As the number of F-pairs increases, per- 
formance on any one F-pair decreases syste- 
matically although R-pair recall is unaffected. 
(c) The loss rate of F-item recall over time is 
very rapid, and can be interpreted as providing 
a measure of the rate at which unrehearsed 
items are lost from short-term memory. When 
a single F-pair was presented and then tested 
after one, two, three, or four R-pairs had been 
presented, the probability of correct recall was 
.75, .34, .19, and .09, respectively. (d)The 
retroactive interference attributable to a single 
R-pair on the recall of an F-pair exceeds the 
retroactive interference attributable to a com- 
parable F-pair on the recall of a preceding F- 
pair. On the average, each additional R-pair 
reduces F-pair performance by approximately 
50 ~ ;  each additional F-pair reduces perform- 
ance on a preceding F-pair by approximately 
30~. (e) The data permit an analysis of 
whether the overall effect of a signal to forget 
is positive or negative, that is, whether the 
benefits accruing to R-items are greater or less 
than the impairment in the recall of F-items. 
The outcome of the analysis (Table 3) is not 
conclusive, but it appears that the positive 
and negative effects of a signal to forget are 
approximately equal in magnitude. (f) Finally, 
the pattern of intrusions of responses from R- 
pairs and F-pairs other than the pair tested 
varies in a striking way with whether the pair 
tested is an R-pair or F-pair. In general, intru- 
sions are predominantly responses that are 
appropriate to the set being tested. 
Mechanisms of Directed Forgetting 
The results of the present experiment are in 
strong agreement with an implication derivable 
from the results of several other studies of 
directed forgetting (e.g., Block, 1971; Elmes, 
Adams, & Roediger, 1970; Woodward & 
Bj ork, 1971): The lack of proactive interference 
by presignal pairs on retention of postsignal 
pairs cannot be accounted for by assuming 
that presignal items are either erased or decay 
rapidly from memory. To-be-forgotten items 
are simply not absent from memory: That sub- 
stantial information about F-items can be 
retrieved from memory is demonstrated by the 
current study, and the studies by Elmes et al. 
(1970) and Block (I 971) reveal that recognition 
of F-items in some situations may suffer no 
impairment at all compared to recognition of 
R-items. 
At the same time that the present results rule 
out erasure or decay as the sole or principal 
process by which subjects accomplish the 
functional forgetting of F-items, they strongly 
support the set differentiation mechanism 
proposed by Bjork (1970, 1972) in his theory of 
directed forgetting. Bjork argues that subjects 
take advantage of a forget instruction in the 
following way: They differentially group all 
items following a forget signal into a set that 
functionally segregates them from the to-be- 
forgotten items, and they devote all rehearsal 
and mnemonic efforts following the forget 
signal to the to-be-remembered items. Recall 
of R-items is assumed not to suffer interference 
from F-items because retrieval activities are 
restricted to the set of R-items in memory; 
since F-items are differentiated in memory by 
virtue of their being disjoint from the set of R- 
items, they do not interfere. 
The following results from the present study 
are evidence in support of the set differentia- 
tion mechanism. (a) On tests of R-pairs, 
subjects' overt intrusions are almost exclu- 
sively responses from other R-pairs. On in- 
formed tests of F-pairs, however, intrusions 
of responses from other F-pairs become several 
times more frequent than intrusions of re- 
sponses from R-pairs. Thus, it appears that 
subjects are able to direct their retrieval efforts 
to the set of pairs in memory appropriate to 
the nature of the pair being tested. (b) Further 
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evidence for such a differential search is pro- 
vided by the results of the uninformed tests of 
F-pairs. Such tests lead subjects to misdirect 
their retrieval efforts and they retrieve the 
correct response with negligible frequency. 
(e) Although F-pairs do not interfere with R- 
pairs, they interfere with each other. It is as 
though interference within the forget set occurs 
in memory, but the forget set does not inter- 
fere with the remember set in memory. 
Although the results of the present study 
demonstrate that the absence of proactive 
interference owing to presignal pairs on the 
recall of postsignal pairs depends little if at all 
on the "forgetting" of presignal items, at least 
in the usual sense of the term, they do not cast 
much additional light on the mechanism of set 
differentiation itself. It may be that subjects 
avoid rehearsing presignal items. Presignal 
pairs still are available, however, and they 
somehow must be distinguished from the 
items to be rehearsed. Since the time interval 
between the last presignal item and the first 
postsignal item is no longer than the interval 
between other pairs of items, it is unlikely that 
the two sets of items can be differentiated 
solely on the basis of some kind of time tag. 
Certainly there is nothing about the items 
themselves that differentiates presignal from 
postsignal sets. On the contrary, the items in 
the two sets are highly similar, and normally 
we would expect substantial interference, in 
the form of confusion or miscoding of post- 
signal items, owing to the context created by 
the presignal set. The present data would 
appear to require the conclusion that subjects 
are capable not only of complex encodings of 
stimuli (Wickens, 1970), but also of adding 
new dimensions in the course of encoding. 
Although the interviews conducted after 
the experimental sessions were mainly for the 
purpose of defining a basic experimental 
group, subjects also were asked about what 
they had done to forget presignal pairs when 
the signal to forget occurred. The answers they 
gave are at most suggestive, but they do bear in 
interesting ways on the set differentiation 
problem. Many of the answers stressed a pas- 
sive letting go. One typical subject reported 
that forgetting presignal pairs simply meant 
not repeating them to herself anymore. An- 
other replied that she just concentrated on the 
second part. Many described starting over 
with the postsignal items "as if there were two 
completely different lists." 
There were other kinds of responses as well, 
however. One subject tried to deal with each list 
by forming a single sentence from its pairs. 
When the signal occurred, she responded by 
"starting a new sentence." Another, in addi- 
tion to whatever mental operations she 
carried out, reported that she switched fingers 
whenever the position of the pairs changed 
with respect to the line. The relation of these 
statements to the psychological processes in- 
volved is problematic. Still one cannot help 
being struck by the sheer variety in the subjects' 
reports. If taken seriously, they suggest that 
set differentiation may best be regarded as a 
functional concept, an end result achievable by 
any of a variety of strategies and techniques. 
This study was designed to provide data 
about the techniques subjects use for organiz- 
ing information, and in particular, about how 
information no longer needed is disposed of. In 
that light, the conclusion that subjects dispose 
of information by marking it, that is, by adding 
information during encoding, may seem some- 
what paradoxical. One might note, however, 
that such procedures are quite routine in deal- 
ing with comparable information handling 
problems in computer systems. Furthermore, 
for what they are worth, the subjects' com- 
ments cited above are entirely compatible with 
such a conjecture. 
Strategy Control as an Experimental Technique 
The findings reported in the results section 
of this paper indicate that the strategy control 
training achieved its purpose. It is true that 
only 32 of the 82 subjects satisfied the inter- 
view criterion. But all subjects who gave any 
indication at all that they had not followed 
the instructions perfectly throughout the entire 
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experiment were excluded. Many of those ex- 
cluded reported nothing more than a difficulty 
in carrying out the instructions on the first 
two or three trials, or a very infrequent lapse 
over the course of the experiment. Thus, the 
large number of noncriterial subjects mainly 
reflects the stringency of the criterion. The 
fact that the results for the noncriterial sub- 
jects generally coincide closely with those for 
the basic experimental group suggests that 
most subjects are capable of the kind of 
strategy control required in this study. 
It is interesting to note that the original 
Bjork paradigm itself assumes that subjects can 
be instructed to exert a degree of voluntary 
control ("forgetting" or "not  forgetting") 
over their mental activity. Thus Bjork's 
studies, like much other current work, for 
example the extensive current work on 
imagery, reflect the gradual alteration in our 
notions of reasonable experimental procedure 
that has resulted from the growth of strategy 
system conceptions of behavior. In that re- 
spect, the present experiment only goes a step 
further. It assumes that humans are capable of 
developing and utilizing complex strategies, it 
encourages development of the desired stra- 
tegies through appropriate instructions and 
training, and it compares resulting perform- 
ance with performance in a reference condi- 
tion, to assess the adequacy of the experi- 
mental procedures directly. If we do not con- 
trol strategy by training and instruction, some 
subjects will use imagery, others will make up 
stories, and still others, noting that the experi- 
menter said nothing about mnemonics, will 
avoid using them even if they know about 
them. What we accomplish by not controlling 
strategies is to limit the information we get 
from our data. 
Strategy control runs counter to some stan- 
dard statistical modes of thought in that it 
depends upon an unwillingness to treat 
strategy change as a source of error variance. 
But as Reitman (1970) points out, those modes 
of thought are themselves inconsistent with an 
information processing conception of beha- 
vior. Behavior is not to be accounted for in 
terms of a set of additive components. It is 
generated by a system in which some of the 
components (the strategies) switch other com- 
ponents on and off at various times and as a 
function of the outcome of prior processing. In 
this light strategy control procedures, with 
suitable checks, are the appropriate experi- 
mental tools. 
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